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TITLE: MEXICO HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution and Federal Labor Law (FLL) provide workers
the right to form and join trade unions of their choice. About
30 percent of the total work force is organized, which implies
an effective unionization rate nearly twice that high, since
only about half the work force is employed in the formal
private or public sector, accessible to union organization.
No prior approval is needed to form unions, but they must
register with federal or state labor authorities to obtain
legal status to function effectively. Registration
requirements are not onerous. There are credible allegations,
however, that federal or state labor authorities occasionally
withhold or delay registration of unions hostile to government
policies, employers, or established unions, or register
extortionists or labor racketeers falsely claiming to represent
workers. To remedy this latter problem, Labor Secretariat
(STPS) officials require evidence that unions are genuine and
representative before registering them.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts
(COE) found that certain restrictions in federal employee labor
law, a separate section of the Constitution and FLL, violate
freedom of association. At the request of federal employee
unions, the law allows only one union per jurisdiction and
forbids reelection of union officials--provisions acceptable in
union statutes but not in law. The COE welcomed the fact that
privatization of most banks ended these legal restrictions on
their unions.
Mexican unions form federations and confederations freely
without government approval. Most belong to such bodies.
They, too, must register to get legal status. Questionable
delays occur occasionally, but none were reported in 1994.
The largest trade union central is the Confederation of Mexican
Workers (CTM), organizationally part of the ruling PRI. CTM's
major rival centrals and nearly all the 34 smaller
confederations, federations, and unions in the Labor Congress
(CT) are also allied with the ruling PRI. However, the
teachers' union, a large CT affiliate, severed its ties to the
PRI to free its factions to cooperate openly with other
parties. Rivalries within and between PRI-allied centrals are
strong. There also are a few small labor federations and
independent unions outside the CT which are not allied to the
PRI.
Unions are free to affiliate with, and are often active in,
trade union internationals.
Union officers help select, run as, and campaign for, PRI
candidates in federal and state elections, and support PRI
government policies at crucial moments. This gives the unions
considerable influence on government policies, but limits their
freedom of action to defend member interests in other ways,
particularly when this might threaten the Government or the
PRI. After the 1991 federal elections, the proportion of CT
Senators and deputies fell to under 10 percent, but in 1994 the
CT, and especially the CTM, regained some lost congressional
nominations, and nearly all labor candidates won handily.
The Constitution and FLL provide for the right to strike. The
law requires 6 to 10 days' advance strike notice, followed by
brief government mediation. If federal or state authorities
rule a strike "nonexistent" or "illicit," employees must remain
at work, return to work within 24 hours, or face dismissal. If
they rule the strike legal, the company or unit must shut down
totally, management officials may not enter the premises until
the strike is over, and the company may not hire striker
replacements. The law permits public sector strikes, but they
are rare. Provisions for maintaining essential services are
not onerous.
Most strike notices precede successful collective bargaining
and are never implemented. During 1993, 7,200 strike notices
were filed with federal labor boards, and 148 legal strikes
occurred. The authorities ruled only two nonexistent and none
illicit; two were withdrawn, they transferred 309 to state
boards (not federal jurisdiction), and put 702 on file awaiting
further information.
There were credible allegations that federal or state labor
authorities occasionally stretch legal requirements to rule
strikes nonexistent or illicit, or use delays to prevent
damaging strikes and force settlements, but there was not a
consistent pattern. The Constitution and FLL protect labor
organizations from government interference in their internal
affairs, including strike decisions, which can also protect
undemocratic or corrupt union leaders. The law permits closed
shop and exclusion clauses, allowing union leaders to vet and
veto new hires and force dismissal of anyone the union expels.
Such clauses are common in collective bargaining agreements.
Employer organizations have pushed for labor law reform which
would limit union leaders' powers, but unions have successfully
resisted. However, the Government has induced de facto reform
through tripartite national pacts (see below) and collective
bargaining at the enterprise level.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Constitution and FLL strongly uphold the right to organize
and bargain collectively. Interest by a few employees, or a
union strike notice, compels an employer to recognize a union
and negotiate, or ask the federal or state labor board to hold
a union recognition election. FLL pro-union provisions lead
some employers to seek out independent, "white," or company
unions as an alternative to mainstream national or local
unions. Representation elections are traditionally open, not
secret. Management and union officials are present with the
presiding labor board official when each worker openly declares
his or her vote. Such open "recounts" are prevailing practice,
but not required by law or regulation. Secret ballots are held
when all parties agree.
Annual national pacts negotiated by the Government and major
trade union, employer, and rural organizations have voluntarily
limited free collective bargaining for the past decade. These
pacts were intended to stop inflation and to support the
Government's free market economic reforms and structural
adjustment policies. The mainstream labor organizations
reluctantly accepted drastic reductions in members' real
incomes in the late 1980's, although these regained some lost
ground over the last 5 years.
The record in internal union democracy and transparency is
mixed. Some unions are democratic, but corruption or
authoritarian and strong-arm tactics are common in others. In
1994 dissidents protested, alleging such practices in four of
Mexico's strongest unions. For example, they alleged fraud
when the railroad union, an independent CT member, elected
officers in October by secret ballot, although these
allegations appeared unsubstantiated. Three of the strongest
national CTM unions--petroleum, electric, and sugar
workers--have dissident movements which accused leaders of
undemocratic or strong-arm tactics. Electric union dissidents
succeeded in pressuring the leadership into giving them several
regional leadership posts.
The public sector is almost totally organized. Industrial
areas are heavily organized, but states with little industry
often have few unions. The law protects workers from antiunion
discrimination, but enforcement is uneven, especially in states
with low unionization.
Unionization and wage levels in the in-bond export sector vary
by area, but, especially in the west, are lower than in most
other industries. Some observers allege poor working
conditions, inadequate wages, and employer and government
efforts to suppress unionization. There is no evidence the
Federal Government opposes unionization of these plants, which
tend to be under state jurisdiction, but some state and local
governments, as well as some employers, are known to discourage
unions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced labor. There have been no
credible reports of forced labor for many years.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The law bans child labor and sets the minimum legal work age at
14. Although the activities of those aged 14 and 15 are so
restricted as to be uneconomic (no night or hazardous work,
limited hours), the ILO reported that 18 percent of children
aged 12 to 14 work, often for parents or relatives. Enforcement
is reasonably good at large and medium-sized companies,
especially in export industries and those under federal
jurisdiction. Enforcement is inadequate at the many small
companies and in agriculture. It is nearly absent in the
informal sector, despite government efforts. Most child labor
is in the informal sector (including myriad underage street
vendors), agriculture, and in rural areas.
The Government increased obligatory school years from 6 to 9 in
1992 and made parents legally liable for their children's
attendance, as part of a reform to upgrade Mexican labor force
skills and long-term efforts to continue increasing educational
opportunities for youth.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Constitution and the FLL provide for a daily minimum wage.
The tripartite national minimum wage commission (government,
labor, employers), sets minimum wage rates each December,
effective January 1. On January 2, 1995, after the year-end
exchange rate crisis and peso float, the 1995 minimum daily
wage in Mexico City and nearby industrial areas, Acapulco,
southeast Veracruz state's refining and petrochemical zone and
most border areas, was $3.27 (16.34 new pesos). Minimum wage
earners are actually paid $3.70 (18.48 new pesos) by their
employers due to a supplemental 14 percent fiscal subsidy
(negative income tax or tax credit), which employers then
subtract from their own taxes. These income supplements to the
minimum wage, agreed in the annual tripartite pacts, are for
all income less than four times the minimum wage, decreasing as
wages and benefits rise. In Guadalajara, Monterrey, and other
advanced industrialized areas, the 1995 minimum daily wage
(before the fiscal subsidy) was $3.04 (15.18 new pesos). In
other areas, it was $2.76 (13.79 new pesos).
There are higher minimums for some occupations, such as
building trades. Few workers (12 percent, including most
waiters and hotel workers, who depend on tips) earn only the
minimum wage. Industrial workers average three to four times
the minimum wage, earning more at bigger, more advanced, and
prosperous enterprises. The 1995 minimum daily wage in pesos
was increased by 7 percent (4 percent for projected inflation
and 3 percent for productivity), plus a 3-percent increase in
the fiscal subsidy--a 10-percent total increase. The 1995
minimum daily wage is for the whole year, but inflation
projections have been revised upward and any of the three
parties can ask that the board reconvene during the year to
consider a changed situation, although labor and employers
agreed not to do so during the first months of 1995. On
January 3, 1995, labor, employers, and the Government agreed to
establish a committee to study further tax changes.
The law and contract arrangements provide workers extensive
additional benefits. Legally required benefits include
individual retirement accounts, social security (IMSS)
coverage, individual worker housing accounts, substantial
Christmas bonuses, paid vacations, and profit-sharing.
Employer costs for these benefits run from about 27 percent of
payroll at marginal enterprises to over 100 percent at major
firms with generous union contracts.
The FLL sets 48 hours as the legal workweek. Workers asked to
exceed 3 hours of overtime per day or work overtime on
3 consecutive days must be paid triple the normal wage. For
most industrial workers, especially under union contract, the
true workweek is 42 hours, although they are paid for 6 full
days. This is why unions jealously defend the legal ban on
hourly wages.
The law requires employers to observe occupational safety and
health regulations issued jointly by STPS and IMSS, and pay
contributions which vary according to their workplace safety
and health experience ratings. FLL-mandated joint (management
and labor) committees set standards and are responsible for
workplace enforcement in plants and offices. These meet at
least monthly to consider workplace needs and file copies of
their minutes with federal labor inspectors, who assumed
jurisdiction for all such inspections in 1987, supplanting
state inspectors and strengthening inspection considerably.
The inspectors schedule visits largely in response to these
workplace committees.
Individual employees or unions may also complain directly to
inspectors or safety and health officials. Workers may remove
themselves from hazardous situations without jeopardizing their
employment. Plaintiffs may bring complaints before the Federal
Labor Board at no cost to themselves.
STPS and IMSS officials report compliance is reasonably good at
most large companies. Federal inspectors are stretched too
thinly for effective enforcement if companies do not comply
voluntarily and fulfill their legal obligation to train workers
in occupational health and safety matters. There are special
problems in construction, where unskilled, untrained,
poorly-educated, transient labor is common, especially at many
small sites and companies. Many unions, particularly in
construction, are not organized effectively to provide training
and to encourage members to work safely and healthily, to
participate in the joint committees, and to insist on their
rights.